User's Manual
Table Of Contents
- Table of Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Figure1.1 Typical SEL3022 and SEL5810 Virtual Serial Software Application 1.2
- Figure1.2 Encrypted Packet Stream 1.4
- Figure1.3 Typical Connections for the SEL3022 1.6
- Figure1.4 Typical Alarm Output Installation 1.8
- Figure2.1 SEL3022 Dimension Drawing 2.2
- Figure2.2 Windows Run Command 2.3
- Figure2.3 Product Unregistered Prompt 2.4
- Figure2.4 Select a Device Type to Create 2.7
- Figure2.5 Specify New Device Location 2.8
- Figure2.6 Opening Device 2.8
- Figure2.7 Identification Screen 2.9
- Figure2.8 Status: Device 2.10
- Figure2.9 Settings: Wireless 2.10
- Figure2.10 Settings: WEP Keys 2.11
- Figure2.11 Settings: User 2.11
- Figure2.12 Settings: Operator 2.12
- Figure2.13 Settings: Security Officer 2.12
- Figure2.14 Confirm Send Prompt 2.13
- Figure2.15 Send Operation Message 2.13
- Figure2.16 Select Items to Print 2.14
- Figure2.17 Print Window 2.14
- Figure3.1 Remotely Located Recloser Control 3.2
- Figure3.2 Job Done Example SEL-5809 Top Level View 3.3
- Figure3.3 Select a Wireless Session for DNP3 Job Done Example 3.4
- Figure3.4 Settings: DCE Port 3.4
- Figure3.5 Status: Virtual Serial Port With Connection Status Red 3.5
- Figure3.6 Communication Parameters Window in acSELerator 3.6
- Figure3.7 Status: Virtual Serial Port With Connection Status Green 3.6
- Figure3.8 Reading Settings Via the SEL3022 3.7
- Figure3.9 Monitoring SEL651R Meter Data Via the SEL3022 3.8
- Figure3.10 Status: Virtual Serial Port Connection Status Red 3.9
- Figure3.11 Specify Device to Export to SEL5810 Virtual Serial Software 3.10
- Figure3.12 Export Encrypted User Configuration File 3.10
- Figure3.13 Store Encrypted File 3.11
- Figure3.14 Password Prompt in SEL5810 Virtual Serial Software 3.12
- Figure3.15 Communication Parameters Window in acSELerator 3.13
- Figure3.16 Reading SER Report Via acSELerator 3.14
- FigureB.1 PC to SEL3022 Connection B.2
- FigureB.2 SEL3022 and SEL-5809 Connection Parameters B.2
- FigureB.3 SEL5809 Settings Software Connection Method B.3
- FigureB.4 SEL-5809 Opening Connection B.3
- FigureB.5 Status: Device Window B.4
- FigureB.6 Confirmation Prompt B.4
- FigureB.7 Send Operation Prompt B.4
- FigureB.8 Configuring Serial Port Settings in the Terminal Software B.5
- FigureB.9 Send File Prompt B.6
- FigureB.10 Sending Confirmation Window B.6
- FigureB.11 Terminal Invalid Firmware Error Message B.7
- FigureB.12 Terminal Valid Firmware Message B.7
- FigureC.1 Two Independent Layers of Cryptographic Security Protect the SEL3022 Wireless Operato...
- FigureC.2 Operation of the HMAC SHA-1 Keyed Hash Authentication Function C.9
- FigureC.3 Operation of the AES Encryption Function C.10
- FigureC.4 SEL3022 Security Application Overview C.11
- FigureC.5 Wireless Interface Session Authentication Dialog C.15
- Preface
- Introduction & Specifications
- Installation
- Job Done Example
- Settings and Commands
- Testing and Troubleshooting
- Firmware and Manual Versions
- Firmware Upgrade Instructions
- Wireless Operator Interface Security
- Introduction
- Wireless Interface Security Overview
- IEEE 802.11 WEP Security
- The SEL Security Application
- Certificates
- Glossary
SEL-3022 Transceiver Instruction Manual Date Code 20050615
Wireless Operator Interface Security
The SEL Security Application
C.10
Cryptographic Manual—Do Not Copy
To produce a cryptographically secure signature of a message, NIST designed the
SHA-1 hash function to have the following properties:
➤ Given the SHA-1 hash function, H(m), and its output, h, it is
extremely difficult to derive a message, m, such that H(m) = h.
➤ Given a message, m, it is extremely difficult to find another message,
m', that produces the same SHA-1 hash output.
The first condition states that the output of the SHA-1 hash function used in the HMAC
authentication function does not give away any clues about the form, or classes, of
messages that would likely produce the same hash value. The second condition, known
as collision-resistance, states that there is no bias in the mapping of inputs to outputs
that would aid an attacker in finding messages that produce identical SHA-1 hash
values. Both conditions make it functionally impossible (given all realistic resources)
to alter a message in such a way as to produce the same hash value. The HMAC
specification provides a cryptographically secure way to combine the secret
authentication key and the protected message into the SHA-1 hash function input to
produce a key-dependent message fingerprint.
AES Overview
The AES encryption function uses a 128-bit-long secret key and scrambles the contents
of each frame prior to transmission to provide cryptographically strong data
confidentiality.
Encryption is the process of transforming a digital message from its original form into
a form that an unauthorized individual cannot interpret. The output of the encryption
process is a function of the message and an encryption key (see Figure C.3).
Figure C.3 Operation of the AES Encryption Function
This encryption process must be completely reversible by an authorized individual
with access to the secret decryption key. Authority to read a message is only granted by
sharing knowledge of the secret decryption key. Ideally, only individuals with
knowledge of the decryption key can reverse the encryption operation and interpret the
protected message. There are two main classes of encryption functions. Symmetric key
encryption relies on the same secret key value, K, to perform both the encryption and
decryption transformations. Asymmetric key encryption, on the other hand, uses a
different key for encryption and decryption. For example, asymmetric encryption
Encryption Key Decryption Key
Hi Bob!
*4gu>g
aIL8}2=h
AES
Encrypt
Hi Bob!
AES
Decrypt
Preliminary Copy