Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
Page 83 of 85
Mapping of assurance measures to assurance requirements is provided in Table 6-1 Assurance
Measures.
8.10 PP Claims Rationale
The TOE conforms to the US Government Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access System
Protection Profile for Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.0, April 2006.
The following IT security requirements statements included in this ST contain completed WLANAS
PP operations:
FAU_GEN.1, FCS_CKM_EXP.2, FCS_COP_EXP.2, FDP_RIP.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_USB.1, FPT_TST_EXP.1, FTP_ITC_EXP.1, FTP_TRP.1, FAU_SAR.3,
FAU_STG.3, FIA_UAU_EXP.5, FIA_UID.1
Except as noted earlier in this section, this ST does not contain any security objectives or TOE
security functional requirements that are additional to the security objectives and the IT security
requirements of WLANAS PP. Additional SFRs for the TOE IT environment have been defined to
provide a more detailed description of the TOE environment - this does not impact the conformance
of this ST to the PP.
The PP includes the requirement FMT_MTD.1(3), which specifies that the TOE users can only
change their own authentication credentials. Since the TOE and the wireless authentication
protocols implemented by the TOE do not allow non-administrator users to change their
authentication credentials, the requirement FMT_MTD.1(3) would need to be refined to specify
“administrators” instead of “TOE Users”. Such a refined requirement would then be a duplicate of
FMT_MTD.1(2), which is already included in the ST. Therefore, both the requirements
FMT_MTD.1(2) and FMT_MTD.1(3) of the PP are covered by the requirement FMT_MTD.1(2) of
the ST.