Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
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dependencies were introduced as a result of completing each operation. With the exception of
dependencies related to FMT_MSA.2, all dependencies in this ST have been satisfied.
FMT_MSA.2 is included in this ST as a dependency of the Cryptographic Support family
(FCS_COP and FCS_CKM). It is used there to ensure that security attributes related to
cryptographic objects (e.g. cryptographic keys) are protected. However, FMT_MSA family is also
used to ensure the protection of security attributes related to access control policies (FDP_IFC and
FDP_AFC) and includes a dependency upon those Security Functional Requirements. However,
this ST and WLANAS PP do not require that the TOE implement an access control policy and those
requirements have not been included in the ST.
FCS_CKM.1 depends on FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1, which are not included in this ST. Instead,
FCS_CKM_EXP.2 and FCS_COP_EXP.2 are included, which cover the requirements of
FCS_CKM.2 and FCS_COP.1. FAU_GEN.1 depends on FPT_STM.1, which is not included in this
ST. Instead, FPT_STM.1_EXP.1 is included, which covers the requirements of FPT_STM.1.
The satisfaction of dependencies in this ST is identical to the satisfaction of dependencies in
WLANAS PP.
8.7 Rationale for Strength of Function Claims
Part 1 of the CC defines “strength of function” in terms of the minimum efforts assumed necessary
to defeat the expected security behavior of a TOE security function. There are three strength of
function levels defined in Part 1: SOF-basic, SOF-medium and SOF-high. SOF-basic is the strength
of function level chosen for this ST. SOF-basic states, “a level of the TOE strength of function
where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.” The rationale for choosing SOF-basic was
to be consistent with the TOE objective O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS and assurance
requirements included in this ST. Specifically, AVA_VLA.1 requires that the TOE be resistant to
obvious vulnerabilities. This is consistent with SOF-basic, which is the lowest strength of function
metric. Consequently, security functions with probabilistic or permutational mechanisms chosen for
inclusion in this ST were determined to adequately protect information in a Basic Robustness
Environment.
The password used for administrator authentication is the only probabilistic or permutational
mechanism implemented by the TOE. This mechanism is associated with the Identification and
Authentication security function. The TOE requires the administrator password to be at least 8
characters long. Numeric, alphabetic, and extended characters can be used, which gives a total of
95 characters. Therefore, the number of potential eight-character passwords is very significant.
The SOF claims of this ST match those of WLANAS PP.
8.8 Rationale for Explicit requirements
Table 8-4 Rationale for Explicit Requirements presents the rationale for the inclusion of the explicit
requirements found in this ST. The rationale matches that of WLANAS PP. The explicit
requirements are reproduced from the WLANAS PP and are left unchanged to maintain compliance
to the protection profile.
Table 8-4 Rationale for Explicit Requirements