Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
Page 74 of 85
OE.TIME_STAMPS
The TOE IT environment
shall provide reliable time
stamps and the capability
for the administrator to set
the time used for these
time stamps.
FPT_STM.1
FMT_MTD.1(5)
FPT_STM.1 requires that the TOE IT
environment be able to provide reliable time
stamps for its own use and that of the TOE.
Time stamps include date and time and are
reliable in that they are always available to the
TOE, and the clock must be monotonically
increasing.
FMT_MTD.1(5) helps satisfy this objective by
providing that there be a management function
of the Security Administrator or an authorized
IT entity that will set the time and date used to
provide reliable time stamps to the TOE.
8.5 Rationale for Assurance Requirements
CC part 3 states:
“EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based
on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial
specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be
economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.”
“EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared
to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 in this ST was chosen based on the
security environment and the security objectives defined in this ST. Due to the nature of wireless
communications the TOE interacts with potentially hostile wireless environment, where any
malicious entity can potentially attack the TOE. Compared to wired networks, where physical
access to the network is usually limited to some extent, this amounts to an additional degree of risk
and justifies evaluating the TOE at EAL4.
The explicitly stated TOE security functional requirements in this ST are those of the WLANAS PP.
All assurance requirements specified in the WLANAS PP have been included in this ST. Therefore,
the assurance requirements of this ST cover the explicitely stated TOE security functional
requirements stated in this ST.
Evaluating the TOE at EAL4 is consistent with the current best IT security practices and provides a
degree of assurance matching that of other evaluated competitive products.
ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw Remediation) was added to EAL4 requirements to match the WLANAS PP.
Therefore, the assurance requirements of this ST match or exceed the requirements of WLANAS
PP in all assurance areas.
8.6 Satisfaction of Dependencies
Each functional requirement, including explicit requirements was analyzed to determine that all
dependencies were satisfied. All requirements were then analyzed to determine that no additional