Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
Page 69 of 85
O.TIME_STAMPS
The TOE shall obtain
reliable time stamps from
the IT Environment and the
capability for the
administrator to set the
time used for these time
stamps.
FPT_STM_EXP.1 FPT_STM_EXP.1 requires that the TOE be
able to obtain reliable time stamps for its own
use and therefore, partially satisfies this
objective. Time stamps include date and time
and are reliable in that they are always
available to the TOE, and the clock must be
monotonically increasing.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide
mechanisms that control a
user’s logical access to the
TOE.
FIA_AFL.1(1)
FIA_ATD.1(1)
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU_EXP.5(1)
FIA_UID.2
AVA_SOF.1
FTA_SSL.3
FTP_TRP1
FTP_ITC_EXP.1(1)
FIA_UID.2 plays a role in satisfying this
objective by ensuring that every user is
identified before the TOE performs any
mediated functions. In most cases, the
identification cannot be authenticated (e.g.,a
user attempting to send a data packet through
the TOE that does not require authentication.
It is impractical to require authentication of all
users that attempt to send data through the
TOE, therefore, the requirements specified in
the TOE require authentication where it is
deemed necessary. This does impose some
risk that a data packet was sent from an
identity other than that specified in the data
packet.
AVA_SOF.1 requires that any permutational or
probabilistic mechanism in the TOE be
analyzed and found to be resistant to attackers
possessing a “low” attack potential. This
provides confidence that security mechanisms
vulnerable to guessing type attacks are
resistant to casual attack.
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU_EXP.5(1)
contribute to thisobjective by ensuring that
administrators and users are authenticated
before they are provided access to the TOE or
its services.
In order to control logical access to the TOE
an authentication mechanism is required. The
local administrator authentication mechanism
is necessary to ensure an administrator has
the ability to login to the TOE regardless of
network connectivity (e.g., it would be
unacceptable if an administrator could not
login to the TOE because the authentication
server was down, or that the network path to
the authentication server was unavailable).
FIA_AFL.1(1) ensures that the TOE can
protect itself and its users from brute force