Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
Page 66 of 85
O.DOCUMENTED_DESIG
N
ADV_FSP.1
ADV_HLD.1
ADV_RCR.1
ADV_FSP.1, ADV_HLD.1, and ADV_RCR.1
support this objective by requiring that the
TOE be developed using sound engineering
principles. The use of a high level design and
the functional specification ensure that
developers responsible for TOE development
understand the overall design of the TOE. This
in turn decreases the likelihood of design flaws
and increases the chance that
accidentaldesign errors will be discovered.
ADV_RCR.1 ensures that the TOE design is
consistent across the High Level Design and
the Functional Specification.
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all
the functions and facilities
necessary to support the
administrators in their
management of the
security of the TOE, and
restrict these functions and
facilities from unauthorized
use.
FMT_MOF.1(1)
FMT_MOF.1(2)
FMT_MOF.1(3)
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MTD.1(1)
FMT_MTD.1(2)
FMT_MTD.1(3)
FMT_SMR.1(1)
FMT_SMF.1(1)
FMT_SMF.1(2)
FMT_SMF.1(3)
The FMT requirements are used to satisfy this
management objective, as well as other
objectives that specify the control of
functionality. The requirements’ rationale for
this objective focuses on the administrator’s
capability to perform management functions in
order to control the behavior of security
functions.
FMT_MOF.1(1)(2) and (3) ensure that the
administrator has the ability manage the
cryptographic, audit, and authentication
functions.
FMT_MSA.2 provides the administrator the
ability to accept only secure values and modify
security attributes.
FMT_MTD.1(1) (2) and (3) ensure that the
administrator can manage TSF data. This ST
specifically identifies audit preselection,
identification, and authentication data.
FMT_SMR.1 defines the specific security roles
to be supported.
FMT_SMF.1(1), (2), and (3) support this
objective by identifying the management
functions for cryptographic data, audit records,
and cryptographic key data.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must mediate the
flow of information to and
from wireless clients
communicating via the
TOE RF
Transmitter/Receiver
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU_EXP.5(1)
FIA_UID.2
FDP_PUD_EXP.1
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU_EXP.5(1) and
FIA_UID.2 ensure that the TOE has the ability
to mediate packet flow based upon the
authentication credentials of the wireless user.
FDP_PUD_EXP.1 allows the administrator to
control whether or not unencrypted data will be