Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
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5.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able
to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.2.1.3 FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from the set of audited
events based on the following attributes:
a) user identity, event type
b) [device interface, wireless client identity].
Application Note: Event type is defined as the BSD syslog severity level indicator, in the Terminology section
of the WLANAS PP.
Application Note: The device interface is the physical interface upon which user (or administrative) data is
received/sent (e.g. WLAN interface, wired LAN interface, serial port, administrative LAN interface, etc.).
5.2.1.4 FCS_BCM_EXP.1 Explicit: baseline cryptographic module
FCS_BCM_EXP.1.1 All cryptographic modules shall comply with FIPS 140-1/2 when performing
FIPS approved cryptographic functions in FIPS approved cryptographic modes of operation.
FCS_BCM_EXP.1.2 The cryptographic module implemented shall have a minimum overall rating
of Level 1.
FCS_BCM_EXP.1.3 The FIPS validation testing of the TOE cryptographic module(s) shall be in
conformance with FIPS 140-1, 140-2, or the most recently approved FIPS 140 standard for which
NIST is accepting validation reports from Cryptographic Modules Testing laboratories.
5.2.1.5 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [ANSI X9.31 PRNG] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[112-bit Triple DES, 168-bit Triple DES, 128-bit AES, 196-bit AES, 256-bit AES, 1024-bit RSA] that
meet the following: [FIPS 140-2 standard].
5.2.1.6 FCS_CKM_EXP.2 Explicit: cryptographic key establishment
FCS_CKM_EXP.2.1 The TSF shall provide the following cryptographic key establishment
technique: Cryptographic Key Establishment using Manual Loading. The cryptomodule shall be able
to accept as input and be able to output keys in the following circumstances [upon issuance of the
key input/output command by the administrator] in accordance with a specified manual
cryptographic key distribution method using FIPS-approved Key Management techniques that
meets the FIPS 140-1/2 Key Management Security Levels 1, Key Entry and Output.