Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
Page 12 of 85
3 TOE Security Environment
This section describes the assumptions, threats, and policies that are relevant to both the TOE and
the TOE environment.
3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
Assumptions are limiting conditions that are accepted before developing policy or considering
threats. Table 3-1 TOE Assumptions identifies the conditions that are assumed to exist in the
operational environment. The TOE Assumptions are identical to those of WLANAS PP.
Table 3-1 TOE Assumptions
Name Assumption
A.NO_EVIL
Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained and follow all
administrator guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose computing or storage repository
capabilities (e.g., compilers, editors, or user applications) available
on the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment
A.TOE_NO_BYPASS
Wireless clients are configured so that information cannot flow
between a wireless client and any other wireless client or host
networked to the TOE without passing through the TOE.
3.2 Threats to Security
Threats are actions that may have an adverse affect on the TOE. Exposure of wireless
communications in the RF transmission environment introduces unique threats for the WLAN. The
WLAN interconnected to a wired network could effectively create a hole in the wired infrastructure
boundary because it exposes information to the RF medium where signals can be more readily
detected and intercepted. With WLANs, an adversary no longer requires physical access to the
network to exploit a wireless system. For basic robustness, the threats identified do not include
those that would be considered a sophisticated attack (e.g., intentional jamming, traffic analysis)
The TOE must counter the following threats to security. The threats to security are identical to those
of WLANAS PP.