User Guide

I was in Selim’s on a Wednesday night,
walking away from Jean-Paul Prideaux’s
usual table in the back (having just
completed the interview with him you’ll
find in this issue), when I overheard the
drunken murmurs of a Turkish official
who shall remain nameless (I protect
my sources, even inadvertent ones).
According to this official, on 1 August
Ankara will unveil a new “Turkish
Diplomatic Forces Windfall Profits Tax”
which will go into effect this coming fall.
Under the terms of the new tax, set at 28% of
applicable gross revenues, “windfall
profits” would include kill bonuses,
gratuities and
any profits in excess of 15%
of monthly operating expenditures!
This tax will devastate the premier
industry of Turkey, hitting grunt and
flyboy with equal force. While the grunt is
fiscally nomadic, roaming wherever the
money is and making less of it, his
overhead is so minimal that putting a
28% tax on profits above 15% of his
overhead effectively deducts another 28%
from his total annual income. And though
merc squadrons regularly deal in eight
and nine digit figures, considering that
most have overhead and maintenance
costs ranging from $10 to $25 million
American per month, an added 28%
deducted from what little profit margin
they accrue guarantees hard times ahead
for even the high end of the industry.
This fact becomes more apparent when
you consider the escalating cost of
insurance premiums. Recent industry
studies reveal that, out of twenty-seven
Istanbul-based merc squadrons, twenty-
four lease jets from outside agencies.
Given the risks involved to aircraft in any
merc operation, insurance never comes
cheap. The three squadrons who can
afford to own their own fighters don’t
need full coverage, but the rest are milked
dry, sometimes paying in premiums more
than they’d pay monthly to purchase the
planes outright (if only they could get
such credit extended to them!). The
situation only worsens as the merc
industry grows, and more planes are
destroyed than ever before. Even without
this new tax, squadrons would have been
hard-pressed to survive. Now, the solven-
cy of most squadrons will be tested to an
unprecedented extent.
This couldn’t come at a worse time for
mercs. The economic doldrums hanging
over Istanbul these past few months have
led to an increase in violence across the
board. Mercs turn to Wiz or RNA out of
boredom or frustration, then sanction
civilians to feed their habits. Employers,
encouraged to daring by the chaos in the
streets, are defaulting on payments,
instigating bloody vendettas that leave
dozens of innocents dead (and all too
often, the offending target isn’t among
them). The proposed new tax will only
exacerbate this release of aggressive
energy, so much of which used to be
focused along, if not peaceful, at least
profitable lines. Mindless destruction
seems to be the order of the day, an
irreversible downward spiral. Or is it?
In this issue we examine the unique
squadron bucking this bloodthirsty trend
— Stern’s Wildcats. Under the leadership
of Commander James Stern, the Wildcats
accept missions based as much on morali-
ty as profit margin, rejecting outright
murder even when the dollar stakes are
high. The questions I raise in this issue
include: are the Wildcats a fluke, or the
future? In light of the violence around
them, considering the new windfall profits
tax, will the Wildcats sink or swim? And
will other squadrons follow?
And what about the Jackals, the
squadron Jean-Paul Prideaux founded
when he broke away from the Wildcats
four years ago? Their philosophy is
somewhat more traditionally mercenary,
Prideaux caring little how a mission
weighs in on the cosmic scale so long
as it balances in the checkbook. The
Jackals’ annual profits are now three
times those of the more idealistic
Wildcats. What does this say about the
future of mercenary philosophy? We’ll
examine both approaches in this issue,
and leave the decision to you.
— GPA
SUDDEN DEATH •
July 2011
3