User Guide

for over 100 years had been based on “control of the seas,” and in the early twenti-
eth century it was the job of our battleships to exercise that control. Now, the time
had come for a drastic revision of U.S. naval strategy. The new strategy was pat-
terned after that first employed by Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, CinC of the
Japanese Combined Fleet. Almost a year before the attack, Yamamoto had ordered
his staff to develop plans for a carrier air strike on Pearl Harbor. His instructions
were clear. The operation was to depart from the generally accepted doctrine of
employing carriers as a protective force for battleships and instead use them as an
offensive air weapon.
1
With no battleships to form a new battle line, our naval com-
mand now had to look to aircraft carriers to carry the war to the enemy.
The attack on Pearl Harbor had other important effects. President Roosevelt had
quickly appointed Admiral Ernest J. King to the post of Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Fleet, with headquarters in Washington. In turn, Vice Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
became Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Significantly, both King and
Nimitz were ex-submarine officers with an appreciation of how submarines could
best be used. Prior to the attack, our submarines had been attached to the
Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet to be deployed as advanced scouts for the battle force.
Now, without a battle force to scout for, and without the speed to keep up with a
fast carrier task force, the Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, was formed. Its com-
mander, Rear Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, Jr. reported directly to Commander,
Pacific Fleet. Fortuitously, the long range, long endurance, speed, and large tor-
pedo load design requirements for the scouting mission were nearly ideal for new
submarine missions in the vast Pacific. Actions had been rapidly implemented
after Pearl Harbor to rebuild the Pacific Fleet. By mid 1942 repairs had been made
to most of the damaged and sunken ships. In addition, new ships, planes and men
began to join the fleet at an accelerating pace. Of particular importance to Pacific
Fleet power was the addition of both large fleet carriers and smaller carriers con-
verted from other hulls. By mid 1943 war production held promise of being able to
provide sufficient resources to continue the offensive already underway in the
South Pacific, and to open a new offensive in the Central Pacific. Toward that end,
CinCPac staff was busy creating plans to dislodge the Japanese from their mid-
Pacific island outposts. By being at the right spot at the right time, Skate had the
opportunity to conduct her first three war patrols concurrently with Fifth Fleet
attacks on Japanese held island groups from Wake to Truk.
It had so happened in the late summer of 1943 that Rear Admiral Charles A.
Pownall, Commander Carrier Task Force Fifteen, had requested ComSubPac to
assign submarines to patrol off the Japanese held islands of Wake, Marcus and the
Gilberts during planned air strikes. They would be used to search for and rescue
U.S. airmen forced or shot down at sea, and to provide navigational information to
the airmen. Although such usage would divert submarines from their primary task
of sinking enemy ships, ComSubPac agreed. Accordingly, Skate and two other sub-
marines were assigned to perform what became known as “Lifeguard Duty.”
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58 APPENDIX A — U.S.S. SKATE AND THE FIFTH FLEET
APPENDIX A:
U.S.S. SKATE AND THE FIFTH FLEET
by William P. Gruner
The year was 1943 and U. S. fortunes of war were improving. On September 5th,
the new fleet submarine U.S.S. Skate (SS305) arrived in Pearl Harbor for train-
ing, deperming and a sound survey to make her less detectable by Japanese MAD
and sonar gear. She had been built at Navy Yard Mare Island, California, and
placed in commission on April 15 under the command of Commander Eugene B.
McKinney. McKinney was a veteran submarine skipper. He had commanded the
fleet submarine Salmon for five war patrols in the South China Sea. In Salmon
he had skirmished inconclusively with two Japanese destroyers and sent a large
repair ship, a passenger-cargo ship and a converted salvage vessel to the bottom.
The new arrival found that the Pacific Fleet had undergone many changes since
the Japanese attack on December 7,1941. Early in the morning of that day, over
350 fighters, bombers and torpedo planes from six Japanese carriers had done
their jobs and departed. Rendered hors de combat were eight of the nine battle-
ships of the Pacific fleet. Added to this loss were most of the military aircraft on
the island. Fortunately, our three Pacific Fleet carriers were not in port that day.
Lexington and Enterprise were at sea and Saratoga was at San Diego for repairs.
Two days later Japanese land-based aircraft sent HMS Prince of Walesand Repulse
to the bottom off the coast of Malaya, 6,000 miles away. Suddenly, both military
and armchair strategists throughout the world were convinced that even large well
armed surface ships were vulnerable to air attacks launched from hundreds of
miles away. Until the attack on Pearl Harbor, the keystone of U.S. naval strategy
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57 APPENDIX A — U.S.S. SKATE AND THE FIFTH FLEET