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These problems were quickly tracked and solved by the torpedo shop at
Pearl Harbor under Commander M.P. Hottel. By the end of 1944, over 60%
of the torpedoes fired were the “wakeless” Mark 18 electric torpedoes.
THE COMMANDERS
The men who successfully fought the war beneath the waves were a differ-
ent breed than their peacetime counterparts. More than one submarine
commander found himself relieved of command for being too cautious in
their prosecution of the war. They were charged with taking the war to the
enemy’s doorstep using untested tactics and unpredictable weapons. These
men saw themselves as an elite force and proved that fact again and again.
Vice Admiral Charles Lockwood
If any one man made a difference in the submarine war it was Charles
Lockwood. The man who would rise to the post of Vice Admiral in com-
mand of the Pacific Submarine Fleet (ComSubPac) graduated from the
Naval Academy and went into submarines. He commanded the submarines
A-2 and B-1 between 1914 and 1918, G-1, N-5, and R-25 in 1920. He also
served as an assistant naval attaché in Tokyo then went on to command the
V-3, otherwise known as the Bonita. Lockwood also instructed at the
Academy and commanded Submarine Division 13 based out of San Diego.
In 1941, Lockwood served as naval attaché in London.
Lockwood reported to Freemantle Australia as Rear Admiral commanding
Division 51 and the South West Pacific Submarine Fleet (ComSubSoWesPac).
His work was cut out for him, as the Japanese increased the dimensions of the
“Greater Co-prosperity Sphere” through the Solomon Islands towards
Australia. Admiral Lockwood proceeded to streamline the procedures for
maintenance and supply of the submarines under his command. He also
attended to reports from experienced submarine commanders of problems
with the Mark 14 torpedo.
In December of 1942 Lockwood was promoted to Vice Admiral and placed in
command of the Pacific Submarine Fleet (ComSubPac) when the plane carry-
ing Admiral Robert English crashed outside of San Francisco killing all
aboard. Lockwood’s first accomplishment was to unravel the bizarre sequence
of problems with the Mark 14 torpedo and Mark 6 detonator. Admiral
Lockwood was also instrumental in the development and introduction of a
larger caliber deck gun, the Mark 18 electric torpedo, the Mark 27 acoustical
torpedo, and improved low-light periscopes.
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54 TORPEDOES: The New Hope
the target to cause a premature explosion. Several commanders also reported
that torpedoes detonated shortly after arming. In July, 1943 Admiral Nimitz,
Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac) ordered that all submarines and
destroyers under his command disable the magnetic component of the Mark
6 detonator. Other commands slowly followed suit, and by March of 1944, all
of the Mark 14 torpedoes were set for contact detonation only.
On 24 July 1943 the Gato class submarine Tinosa, skippered by Lieutenant
Commander L.R. Daspit had sixteen Mark 14 torpedoes aboard, when it
found the 19,200 ton tanker Tonan Maru No. 3. Forced to make a long
range shot at an oblique angle, the Tinosa nevertheless rendered the tanker
immobile with four torpedo hits. Unable to surface because of the Tonan
Maru’s deck guns, the Tinosa lined up a perfect 90 degree shot at an optimal
range of 875 yards. The first torpedo ran true, but failed to explode, as did a
second. After careful checks and aiming, Tinosa fired two more — neither
exploded. Lt. Commander Daspit fired seven of his remaining eight torpe-
does at the helpless tanker, all of which struck home but failed to detonate.
After Lieutenant Commander Daspit’s incredible report, Admiral Lockwood
ordered tests performed at Pearl Harbor. These tests confirmed that the
contact exploder’s firing pin would release, but friction on guide pins
within the mechanism would prevent the firing pin from striking the
primer hard enough to go off. A simple correction was rapidly devised, and
Mark 14 torpedoes went into service that could be expected to run at the
depth set, not explode prematurely, but detonate on what they hit.
Perhaps the most peculiar thing about the various problems suffered by the
U.S. Navy with the Mark 14 torpedo and the Mark 6 detonator is that the
German Kriegsmarine had experienced a nearly identical series of problems.
Problems with depth keeping, the magnetic detonator, and the contact deto-
nator had plagued German U-boat commanders from 1939 well into 1942.
The New Hope
The Mark 18 electric torpedo was developed after examining a German tor-
pedo captured in early 1942. The primary advantage of the electric torpedo
was the lack of a visible wake. Steam torpedoes left a trail of bubbles behind
them that could be seen by a sharp-eyed lookout in time for some vessels to
take evasive maneuvers. Initial testing of the Mark 18 revealed that it had
superior depth control and didn’t suffer from the steam torpedoes’ ten-
dency to dive after firing. The main deficiency of the new electric torpedo
was its slower speed, between 28 and 30 knots. Some initial problems with
the electric torpedo were hydrogen gas leaks from the batteries, slow run-
ning in cold waters, and erratic running caused by defective tail vanes.
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53 TORPEDOES: Problems Arise