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Iran Strives To Regain Military Might; Rearmament Drive
Aims to Restore Gulf Balance
Publication International Defense Review
Date
1996 July 01
Volume/Issue 029/007
Section Strategic & Security Issues
By Line Anoushiravan Ehteshami
As the Cold War drew to a close, Iran entered into a military relationship with the
Soviet Union. Although this event marked a period of growing Western interest in
Iran’s arms-procurement policy and its military and security alliances, it was not
until Iraq - the region’s strongest force between 1980 and 1990 - was defeated in
the 1990-91 Gulf War that this interest became of major concern to Western
powers and their regional allies.
In particular, the types and quantity of advanced weapons systems being added to
Iran’s arsenal, as well as the level and degree of training offered by suppliers,
were alarming observers in the West. Concerns focused on the impact of Iran’s
new military hardware on its offensive-operations capability, the technical and
technological sophistication of its armed forces, and how these enhancements
might aid Iran’s non-conventional weapons capability.
Contrary to some Western perceptions, it is important to consider the reasons
behind Iran’s rearmament drive. The war with Iraq ended Iran’s military superiority
in the region, it depleted the country’s arsenal to an alarming extent and it created
a technological gap between Iranian forces and those of other Gulf states.
In the absence of Iraq as a countering influence in the area, Iran’s strategy – and
its impact on the Gulf region’s military balance – is of great concern to Western
defense analysts.
From Russia, Iranian purchases have included: aircraft; tanks and armoured vehi-
cles; artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems; air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-
to-air (SAM) and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs); munitions; electronic-warfare
equipment; submarines; and airborne early-warning platforms. Iran already
possesses over 50 F-7 (MiG-21 equivalent) and 12 F-6 (MiG-19 equivalent)
fighters and interceptors, in addition to 260 T-59 MBTs and SAMs from China.
In view of the political and military importance of Russia to Iran (notwithstanding
Russia’s political importance to Ukraine), neither Tehran nor Kiev appears pre-
pared to jeopardize relations with Moscow for a short-term arms deal. Such con-
cerns naturally inhibit the growth of Iranian-Ukrainian military relations.
LONGBOW 2
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