Specifications
IDS and DoS Alerts
22-14 Rogue Detection and Countermeasures
• SpoofedAP—AroguedevicepretendstobeanEnterasysAPbysending packetswiththe
sourceMACaddressoftheEnterasysAP.Datafromclientsthata ssociat e withtherogue
devicecanbeaccessedbythehackercontrollingtheroguedevice.
Netstumbler and Wellenreiter Applications
NetstumblerandWellenreiterarewidelyavailableapplicationsthathackerscanusetogather
informationabouttheAPsinyournetwork,includinglocation,manufacturer,andencryption
settings.
Wireless Bridge
Awirelessbridgecanextendawirelessnetworkoutsidethedesiredarea.Forexample,someone
canplaceawirelessbridgenearanexteriorwalltoextendwirelesscoverageoutintotheparking
lot,whereahackercouldthengainaccesstothenetwork.
Ad-Hoc Network
Anad‐hocnetworkisestablisheddirectlyamongwirelessclientsanddoesnotusethe
infrastructurenetwork(anetworkusingan AP).AnAd‐hocnetworkmightnotbeanintentionally
maliciousattackonthenetwork,butitdoesstealbandwidthfromyourinfrastructureusers.
Weak WEP Key Used by Client
Aweakinitializationvector(IV)makesaWEPkeyeasiertohack.MSSalertsyouregardingclients
whoareusingweakWEPIVssothatyoucanstrengthentheencryptionontheseclientsorreplace
theclients.
Note: MSS detects a spoofed AP attack based on the fingerprint of the spoofed AP. Packets from
the real AP have the correct signature, while spoofed packets lack the signature. (See “Enabling AP
Signatures” on page 22-12.)