Specifications

ALC_DEL.1

Cisco documents the delivery procedure for the TOE to include the procedure

on how to download certain components of the TOE from the Cisco website

and how certain components of the TOE are physically delivered to the user.

The delivery procedure detail how the end-user may determine if they have

the TOE and if the integrity of the TOE has been maintained. Further, the

delivery documentation describes how to acquire the proper license keys to

use the TOE components.

ALC_DVS.1

Cisco implements security controls over the development environment. Cisco

meets these requirements by documenting the security controls.

ALC_FLR.2

Cisco documents the flaw remediation and reporting procedures so that

security flaw reports from TOE users can be appropriately acted upon, and

TOE users can understand how to submit security flaw reports to the

developer.

ALC_LCD.1

Cisco documents the TOE development life-cycle to meet these requirements.

ALC_TAT.1

Cisco uses well-defined development tools for creating the TOE.

ATE_COV.2

Cisco demonstrates the interfaces tested during functional testing using a

coverage analysis.

ATE_DPT.2

Cisco demonstrates the TSF subsystems tested during functional testing using

a depth analysis.

ATE_FUN.1

Cisco functional testing documentation contains a test plan, a description of

the tests, along with the expected and actual results of the test conducted

against the functions specified in the ST.

ATE_IND.2

Cisco will help meet the independent testing by providing the TOE to the

evaluation facility.

AVA_VAN.3

Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.

8 Rationale

8.1 Security Objectives Rationale

This section demonstrates that the identified security objectives are covering all aspects of the

security needs. This includes showing that each threat and assumption is addressed by a

security objective and providing the mapping and rationale for the security objectives and the

assumptions, threats, and policies identified in the Security Problem Definition.

As noted in section 3.2 and section 3.3.1, some Threats, Policies, Objectives and Assumptions

were added to this ST beyond those specified in the WLAN PP. All these modifications

augment those that were present in the WLAN PP, and to not interfere with any that were