Specifications

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and algorithms to be used for each IP range or allow plaintext

packets to be set from specified IP address.

Bypass Mode

The routers implement an alternating bypass capability, in which some connections may be

cryptographically authenticated and encrypted while others may not. Two independent internal

actions are required in order to transition into each bypass state: First, the bypass state must be

configured by the Crypto Officer using “match address <ACL-name>" sub-command under

crypto map which defines what traffic is encrypted. Second, the module must receive a packet

that is destined for an IP that is not configured to receive encrypted data. The configuration table

uses an error detection code to detect integrity failures, and if an integrity error is detected, the

module will enter an error state in which no packets are routed. Therefore, a single error in the

configuration table cannot cause plaintext to be transmitted to an IP address for which it should

be encrypted.

2.2.3 Unauthenticated Services

The services available to unauthenticated users are:

• Viewing the status output from the module’s LEDs

• Powering the module on and off using the power switch

• Sending packets in bypass

2.2.4 Strength of Authentication

The security policy stipulates that all user passwords must be 8 alphanumeric characters, so the

password space is 2.8 trillion possible passwords. The possibility of randomly guessing a

password is thus far less than one in one million. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a

successful random password guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of 28

million password attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the

module to support.

When using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 1024 bit to 2048 bit,

thus providing between 80 bits and 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an

attacker would have a 1 in 280 chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger

than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability

of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of

approximately 1.8x1021 attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of

the modules to support.

When using preshared key based authentication, the security policy stipulates that all preshared

keys must be 8 alphanumeric characters, so the key space is 2.8 trillion possible combinations.

The possibility of randomly guessing this is thus far less than one in one million. To exceed a

one in 100,000 probability of a successful random guess in one minute, an attacker would have

to be capable of 28 million attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of

the module to support.