Technical data

Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Page 46 of 48
8.2.1.6 O.USER_AUTHENTICATION
The TOE will verify the claimed identity of users.
This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• FIA_AFL.1: The TOE locks user accounts as a result of too many failed logon attempts.
• FIA_ATD.1: The TOE maintains security attributes for administrative users.
• FIA_SOS.1: The TOE provides administratively defined constraints on user passwords.
• FIA_UAU.2: The TOE performs user authentication before allowing any other actions.
• FIA_UAU.5: The TOE supports the authentication of users via a local database of user accounts, via third-
party RADIUS servers or via third-party LDAP servers.
8.2.1.7 O.USER_IDENTIFICATION
The TOE will uniquely identify users.
This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• FIA_ATD.1: The TOE maintains security attributes for administrative users.
• FIA_UID.2: The TOE offers no TSF-mediated functions until the user is identified. Administrative users
are identified using user identifiers.
8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL-4 augmented was selected as the assurance level because the TOE is a commercial product whose users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security. ALC_FLR.2 was selected to exceed EAL-4 assurance
objectives in order to ensure that identified flaws are addressed. The TOE is targeted at a relatively benign
environment with good physical access security and competent administrators. Within such environments it is
assumed that attackers will have little attack potential. As such, EAL-4 is appropriate to provide the assurance
necessary to counter the basic potential for attack.
8.4 Requirement Dependency Rationale
The following table demonstrates that all dependencies among the claimed security requirements are satisfied and
therefore the requirements work together to accomplish the overall objectives defined for the TOE. The one
additional assurance requirement beyond EAL-4 (i.e., ALC_FLR.2) that has been added for this product has been
included in this analysis.
Only FCS_COP.1(2) has unsatisfied dependencies which are justified below this table.
ST Requirement
CC Dependencies
ST Dependencies
FAU_GEN.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_STM.1
FCS_COP.1(1)
[FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]; and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(1), and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(2)
[FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]; and FCS_CKM.4
none
FCS_CKM.1(1)
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(1) and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(2)
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(2) and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_MSA.3(1)
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFC.1 and FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1 and FMT_MSA.3(2)
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2