Technical data

Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Page 23 of 48
5.1.8 Trusted Path (FTP)
5.1.8.1 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1)
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote] users that is logically
distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the communicated data from [disclosure, modification].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [[administrator access of the TOE via
Ethernet]].
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the EAL-4 components and ALC_FLR.2, as specified in Part 3
of the Common Criteria. No operations are applied to the assurance components.
EAL-4 augmented was selected as the assurance level because the TOE is a commercial product whose users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security. ALC_FLR.2 was selected to exceed EAL-4 assurance
objectives in order to ensure that identified flaws are addressed. The TOE is targeted at a relatively benign
environment with good physical access security and competent administrators. Within such environments it is
assumed that attackers will have little attack potential. As such, EAL-4 is appropriate to provide the assurance
necessary to counter the limited potential for attack.
Requirement Class
Requirement Component
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1: Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4: Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1: Implementation representation of the
TSF
ADV_TDS.3: Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.4: Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4: Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1: Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1: Identification of security measures
ALC_FLR.2: Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_LCD.1: Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1: Well-defined development tools
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2: Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.2: Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_FUN.1: Functional testing
ATE_IND.2: Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.3: Focused vulnerability analysis
Table 2 EAL-4 Assurance Components
5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Security architecture description (ADV_ARC.1)
ADV_ARC.1.1d The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security features of the TSF cannot
be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2d The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to protect itself from
tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3d The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.