Specifications

Security Target Version 1.0 9/29/2014

FTP_TRP.1.2

Refinement: The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the trusted

path.

FTP_TRP.1.3

The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication and all

remote administration actions.

Component Assurance Activity:

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote TOE administration

are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also

confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of TOE administration are consistent with

those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST. The evaluator

shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the remote

administrative sessions for each supported method. The evaluator shall also perform the following

tests:

Test 1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational

guidance) remote administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up

the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is

successful.

Test 2: For each method of remote administration supported, the evaluator shall follow the

operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user

to establish a remote administrative session without invoking the trusted path.

Test 3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of remote administration, the channel data is

not sent in plaintext.

Test 4: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of remote administration, modification of the

channel data is detected by the TOE.

Further assurance activities are associated with the specific protocols.

5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The SARs for the TOE are the EAL 1 components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the

SARs have effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs

and SARs.

Requirement Class

Requirement Component

ADV: Development

ADV_FSP.1: Basic functional specification

AGD: Guidance documents

AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance

AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures

ALC: Life-cycle support

ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE

ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM coverage

ATE: Tests

ATE_IND.1: Independent testing - conformance

AVA: Vulnerability assessment

AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability survey

Table 3 EAL 1 Assurance Components