Specifications

Security Target Version 1.0 9/29/2014
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Test 2: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of communication, the channel data is not sent
in plaintext.
Test 3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of communication, modification of the channel
data is detected by the TOE.\par\line Further assurance activities are associated with the specific
protocols.
5.2.6.3 Replay Detection (FPT_RPL.1)
FPT_RPL.1.1
The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [network packets terminated at the TOE].
FPT_RPL.1.2
The TSF shall perform: [reject the data] when replay is detected.
5.2.6.4 Reliable Time Stamp (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
5.2.6.5 Extended: TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during the initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it
is loaded for execution through the use of the TSF-provided cryptographic service specified in
FCS_COP.1(2).
Component Assurance Activity:
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self-tests that are run by the TSF
on start-up; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g.,
rather than saying
5.2.6.6 Extended: Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current version of the
TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital
signature mechanism and [published hash] prior to installing those updates.
Component Assurance Activity:
Updates to the TOE are signed by an authorized source and may have a hash associated. For the
digital signature mechanism, the definition of an authorized source is contained in the TSS, along
with a description of how the certificates used by the update verification mechanism are contained
on the device. The evaluator ensures this information is contained in the TSS. The evaluator also
ensures that the TSS (or the operational guidance) describes how the candidate updates are
obtained; the processing associated with verifying the digital signature, and if implemented,
calculating the hash of the updates; and the actions that take place for successful (signature, and
hash if included, verifications) and unsuccessful (signature, and hash if included. could not be
verified) cases. The evaluator shall perform the following tests:
Test 1: The evaluator performs the version verification activity to determine the current version of